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Neomercantilism and Great-Power 
Energy Competition in Central Asia 
and the Caspian
Charles E. Ziegler 
Rajan Menon
Russia, China, and the United States are vying for political influence 
and control of natural resources in Central Asia in what has been labeled 
a twenty-first-century Great Game.1 Among the conditions drawing 
these major powers to the region are its location at the heart of the Eur-
asian landmass and its bountiful natural resources. China and Russia 
are driven in roughly equal measure by political and economic consider-
ations. They have adopted neomercantilist policies (i.e., state-directed 
efforts aimed at making asymmetric economic gains at the expense of 
competitors, a concept we discuss at length below) to realize their goals 
in the region. The neomercantilist energy policies of China and Russia 
contribute to what is largely a competitive relationship among all three 
great powers in Central Asia. While neomercantilist policies do not 
negate the possibility of cooperation and the development of norms, 
rules, and institutions designed to promote collective action, they 
certainly erect formidable barriers. 
We argue that illiberal states such as Russia and China that selectively 
accept elements of capitalism and the market economy, operate in illiberal 
environments (Central Asia), and compete for vital commodities (oil 
and gas), will adopt neomercantilism as opposed to policies based on 
liberal assumptions and expectations. The institutional legacy of central 
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planning shared by China and Russia (and the Central Asian states) 
creates a path dependence that differentiates the patterns of interaction 
between firms and the state from those found in long-standing liberal 
economies and polities. True, even liberal states may resort to neo- 
mercantilist strategies when it comes to hydrocarbons.2 But illiberal 
states more readily jettison liberal practices, not least because they already 
have scant ideological commitment to them.
Russia and China have pursued neomercantilist strategies in Central 
Asia with varying degrees of success. By contrast, the United States has 
in the main adopted a liberal approach, while supporting the business 
interests of US energy corporations. This article assesses the success and 
limits of the Chinese and Russian neomercantilist strategies in Central 
Asia, advancing three broad hypotheses about major-power behavior in 
energy-rich regions. First: great powers with statist traditions will use 
state-owned or state-controlled firms to secure vital supplies of energy. 
Neomercantilist great powers will exercise state control in tandem with 
market processes when it comes to securing energy resources, not least 
because of the vital role of hydrocarbons in national security.
The second hypothesis is that security considerations will impel great 
powers to assert state control over upstream assets whenever possible. To 
this end, they will seek maximum control over pipeline routes and take 
steps to reduce their vulnerability to supply disruptions created by com-
petitors and efforts by rivals to create export channels that circumvent 
their territories. The logic here is that the market is perceived as not suf-
ficiently reliable to ensure regular supplies of energy at reasonable prices, 
which in turn are essential to national security and the state’s relative 
power. Thus we should expect major powers to use the state to control 
both supply routes, and supplies themselves, to the greatest extent pos-
sible and to act on the assumption that, in economic policy, there is a 
national interest and its best and rightful custodian is the state rather 
than freewheeling private actors or market forces.3  
Our final hypothesis is that major powers’ preoccupation with relative 
gains will lead them to approach hydrocarbons in zero-sum, competitive 
terms, notwithstanding the technical and financial pressures toward co-
operation in a complex industry and even in the face of strictly economic 
reasons to eschew mercantilist policies. In a word, politics and national 
security strongly influence economic decisions. Neomercantilism predicts 
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that states will act on this zero-sum logic in the struggle for resources, 
resulting in major power interactions marked primarily by competition. 
The Neomercantilist Paradigm
Neomercantilism, as we are using the term, is a form of economic 
nationalism. It does not reject the market. Instead, it seeks to protect 
state interests, particularly the political and military standing of a country, 
by trying to shape the national and international workings of markets. 
Its aim is to bend markets to suit national objectives or, failing that, 
to reject efficiency and short-term-profit-driven market calculations in 
favor of those seen to advance national power. To this end, neomercanti- 
list states seek to control the “commanding heights” of the economy, the 
largest and most strategic sectors, through wholly state-owned firms or 
ones that in effect act as agents of the state and are supported by it in 
various ways. States try to ensure the business interests of major firms 
dovetail closely with official policies while realizing the higher growth 
rates and efficiencies enjoyed by publicly traded firms in the global market.4 
The state augments its power, while firms acquire monopoly (or oligop-
oly) rights from the state, ensuring their ability to extract rents. 
Neomercantilism starts from the same point as neorealism.5 It as-
sumes that the anarchic international order drives states toward compe-
tition and maximizing relative power to preserve their sovereignty and 
security and, within the context of these supervening imperatives, to 
pursue the goals that flow from their specific internal and external cir-
cumstances. Moreover, neomercantilism seeks to explain how states will 
craft economic policies to maximize wealth as a part of their effort to 
increase their standing in the international system. They use the govern-
mental apparatus to try to overcome, or at least limit, market outcomes 
that could constrain the development of critical firms—those deemed 
pivotal to the state’s power—and to gain privileged access to essential 
raw materials and markets. Neomercantilism also assumes that states 
seek to control foreign investments and other financial flows and limit 
vulnerability to external economic constraints—even when, in terms of 
the logic of neoclassical economic principles, such choices may not pro-
duce the most efficient outcomes.
While contemporary neomercantilism differs significantly from its 
classical antecedent, one striking commonality is the effort by states 
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to maximize national wealth by securing and using vital raw materials. 
Gold and silver were the strategic commodities for the early modern 
nation-state; oil and natural gas fulfill this role today. Self-sufficiency in 
natural resources confers a major advantage to states, but of the three 
major powers involved in Central Asia, only Russia is self-sufficient in oil 
and gas.6 For great powers lacking adequate supplies of energy, control 
over transit routes becomes vitally important, for both security and pros-
perity. Neomercantilist theory takes explicit account of how geography—and 
for the purposes of this analysis, trade routes and resource locations in 
particular—shapes a state’s calculations concerning economic competition.7
Neomercantilism accepts liberalism’s stress on the importance of pro-
ductive capacity for firms and bureaucracies, but it offers a very different 
view of the appropriate relationship between states and markets. It is 
skeptical of liberalism’s assumption that self-interested individual con-
sumers or firms will necessarily maximize the wealth of nations. Instead, 
it assumes state guidance, even state ownership of firms, in whole or 
part, is essential to ensure the behavior of individuals and firms is con-
sonant with the national interest defined as the country’s relative stand-
ing. State control over the economy is deemed an appropriate, indeed 
essential, strategy to achieve the supreme end of maximizing a country’s 
power in relation to its competitors and to reducing the vulnerabilities 
that accompany integration into the global economy. In contrast to the 
variable-sum logic of liberalism, neomercantilism rests on the zero-sum 
premise that, as self-interested actors driven by their bottom lines, do-
mestic firms may act in ways contrary to the interests of the home state, 
and foreign firms and other countries will do so to an even greater ex-
tent. If liberalism avers that global economic competition and the flow of 
trade and finance should be as unfettered as possible, neomercantilism is 
wary of unregulated markets and interdependence which may diminish 
national prosperity and security of rising powers while working to the 
natural advantage of countries that are already wealthy and powerful.
Energy is critical for great powers determined to ensure national se-
curity and maximize economic wealth. Its importance has grown as the 
prosperity and security of an increasing number of states are tied to 
securing supplies at predictable prices while the number of states that 
consume large amounts of energy has increased. Major oil exporters, 
for their part, are fiercely protective of their sovereignty and either limit 
foreign investment in the hydrocarbon sector or nationalize their petro-
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chemical industries in whole or in part. They see energy as simultane-
ously a source of wealth and political leverage. The result is that even 
those states that pledge fealty to liberal economic principles regularly 
disregard market mechanisms in the interest of preserving national 
security. No state renounces neomercantilist strategies; what differenti-
ates states is the degree and regularity with which they use them and the 
extent to which neomercantilism is embodied in their ideology.
What matters for neomercantilists is the state’s military or economic 
power relative to competitors, and that requires governments to be active 
in promoting trade, shaping investment policy, and supporting national 
firms. Of course, if all states were to behave this way and there were no 
institutional arrangements in place to manage the competition, states 
would threaten one another’s security by, for example, building pref-
erential trading blocs, manipulating currencies, discriminating against 
foreign companies, subsidizing national firms, and locking up sources of 
raw materials. The pervasiveness of such a strategy in the international 
system would increase the likelihood for crises, even conflicts.8 Neo-
mercantilism is skeptical of institutional mechanisms designed to foster 
cooperation because it assumes such structures themselves are captured 
by powerful states to advance their relative position.
Neomercantilist Strategies and Central Asia
Because oil and natural gas are vital commodities for national security, 
there is a natural tendency for states, particularly those with weak com-
mitments to liberalism, to adopt and utilize neomercantilist energy 
policies. But oil and gas are governed by distinctly different markets. 
Oil in recent years has traded on a genuinely global market, with prices 
set by supply and demand and the bulk of supplies delivered by tanker. 
Oil is highly fungible. By contrast, natural gas is not a global commod-
ity; it is traded on regional markets and is usually delivered by pipeline 
(with some traded in liquefied form via tanker). Long-term contracts 
are concluded between suppliers and consumers, with prices indexed to 
substitute fuels, generally oil. With the natural gas fracking revolution 
and the expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and spot trading, the 
gas market is beginning to change, but the fixed, interdependent nature 
of the present gas infrastructure makes these energy relationships more 
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susceptible to politics, as in the EU-Russia gas trade or the Chinese-
Russian gas pipeline negotiations.
The point is, trade in both commodities is still heavily shaped by 
geography (in addition to technology). Given Central Asia’s landlocked 
status, the geopolitical dimension of trade in both commodities is 
reflected in the strategies of the interested major powers operating in the 
region. The United States seeks to limit Russia’s influence, Moscow at-
tempts to preserve its monopoly over export routes, and China pursues 
its strategic interest in diversifying supply networks.
The United States and China, respectively the world’s largest and 
second-largest consumers of oil, are competing for secure supplies. Russia, 
by contrast, is a net energy exporter and in 2012 was the world’s third 
largest producer of crude oil, accounting for 10.4 million barrels per 
day (bpd), nearly 12 percent of world production.9 Central Asia pro-
vides an alternative to potentially unstable suppliers in the Middle East, 
Africa, and Latin America. While the region’s reserves cannot compare 
with those of the Middle East, it does have approximately 3 percent of 
the world’s proven reserves of oil and roughly 4 percent of natural gas 
reserves. In 2012, the Caspian Sea region (which included Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Russia) produced about 2.6 million bar-
rels of crude oil per day and about 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.10 
Moreover, Central Asia’s crude oil and natural gas output could increase 
significantly over the next decade.
The three major powers have competing interests in the region when 
it comes to energy. The United States, the world’s largest importer of 
crude oil, has made tapping the Caspian oil and gas reserves one of its 
three priorities in the region (the other two being promoting democracy 
and enhancing security and stability by countering terrorism, weapons 
proliferation, and narcotics trafficking).11 Various US companies are 
involved in oil and gas production in Central Asia and the Caucasus, 
primarily in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and while Washington gener-
ally supports a more market-based approach to energy than do China or 
Russia, the United States has employed a mix of diplomatic and political 
levers to influence transit routes and facilitate Western access to Central 
Asia’s oil and gas reserves. Washington’s strategy has been to deny Russia 
a monopoly over oil and gas exports from Central Asia by promoting 
alternate export routes, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, and the now-canceled Nabucco 
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gas route. The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), slated to transport 20 bil-
lion cubic meters of gas to Europe, will run from Azerbaijan through 
Greece and Albania and thence under the Adriatic to Italy. Selection of 
the TAP by the Shah Deniz consortium effectively ends the Nabucco 
concept.12 Moscow sees these efforts of Washington and the EU as an 
attempt to erode, even supplant, Russia’s long-established dominance in 
these regions. 
Russia’s Neomercantilist Strategies
Central Asia occupies a pivotal position in Russia’s political and energy 
calculations because of the centrality of energy transportation and sales 
for the Russian economy.13 Although part of Russia’s petrochemical in-
dustry is privately owned (most notably LUKoil and TNK-BP), the state 
is prominently represented by three “national champions”—Gazprom in 
natural gas production and supply, Rosneft in oil production, and Trans-
neft, the state pipeline construction firm. Early in Vladimir Putin’s first 
term as president, these mammoth state firms were given primary re-
sponsibility for restoring Russia’s economic and geostrategic position.14 
Russian energy oligarchs who agreed to support Putin’s state-building 
plan were allowed to retain their private empires, while those seen as 
impediments (Mikhail Khodorkovsky is the most prominent example) 
were jailed or exiled.
Russia’s determination to control transit routes in Central Asia, maxi-
mize political control over the region, preserve its strong position as 
energy exporter to Europe, and enhance state revenues is emblematic of 
the neomercantilist approach. The remnants of Soviet-era energy infra-
structure, together with geopolitical constraints to the south (economic 
sanctions on Iran), force Central Asians to rely heavily on their northern 
neighbor for energy exports. Russia’s state-owned energy companies 
realize substantial revenues from transit fees and reselling gas in the Euro-
pean market.15 Moscow has taken advantage of its position to extract 
rents from Central Asia, whether through reshipment of natural gas to 
Europe or oil piped through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) or 
Atyrau-Samara-Novorossiisk lines. Until the mid 2000s, Gazprom had 
monopolized Turkmenistan’s export options for natural gas because the 
firm owned the pipeline networks the Turkmen government relied on to 
export its gas. This advantage, in part a relic of the Soviet era, enabled 
Russia to buy the bulk of Turkmenistan’s gas output. This strategy in 
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turn strengthened Russia’s ability to increase Europe’s dependence on 
gas supplies from Russia, which already amounts to one-third of its total 
consumption. However, the completion of Turkmenistan’s gas pipeline 
to China (in 2009), and Europe’s stagnant demand for natural gas since 
the Great Recession, have reduced Moscow’s leverage. China has be-
come a major importer of Turkmen gas and has invested substantially in 
Turkmenistan’s gas fields and in pipelines headed from there to China.
Russia is an original partner in the CPC, and state-owned Transneft 
now holds a 31 percent stake in the consortium. The Russian govern-
ment has sought additional advantages for itself through tariffs, corpo-
rate governance, and managerial control. The CPC has been operating 
at capacity and has for years been planning a second stage expansion 
that would nearly double throughput. Until 2008, however, Russia 
had blocked the consortium’s efforts to expand deliveries, demanding 
changes in tariff and interest rates and introducing “take or pay” clauses 
tied to expanded deliveries.16 Moscow’s demands, which seemed based 
more on political considerations than purely economic rationale, were 
an attempt to pressure the other consortium members to improve Russia’s 
position within the CPC. Once Transneft acquired control of the pipe-
line in 2007, the Russian authorities reversed their position and became 
vocal supporters of expanding the CPC’s capacity, particularly for trans-
porting oil from Kazakhstan’s giant Kashagan field, estimated to hold 38 
billion barrels of oil. Russia hopes in this instance hinge on the problems 
Kashagan has faced in terms of delay and massive cost overruns, which 
rose by a factor of two from the original estimate to reach $38 billion.17
Moscow has also sought to block US and European plans to ship 
Central Asia’s natural gas across the Caspian Sea— bypassing Gazprom’s 
monopoly position—by citing environmental hazards. The prospects 
for a trans-Caspian gas pipeline (TCP) from Turkmenbashi to Azerbai-
jan’s Sangachal terminal are murky for two other reasons. First is the un- 
resolved legal status of the sea now that the significance of the Iran-
Russia Treaty of 1921 has been rendered obsolete with the emergence 
of three post-Soviet states on the shore: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan. Second is the failure of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to 
settle their overlapping claims in the Caspian. Though the TCP is but a 
distant possibility, Russia has nevertheless registered its objection to it, 
arguing that the project is a matter for the coastal states to agree on and 
not for the West to push absent a Caspian consensus.18 Russia’s 2007 
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deal with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to adopt the Prikaspiskii route 
through Russia was widely viewed as a defeat for Western-backed plans 
for a trans-Caspian pipeline. However, both Kazakhstan and Turkmeni-
stan have resisted Moscow’s efforts to control supply routes, demon-
strating their intentions to keep their options open by supplying the 
Western-backed TCP (in the event it is built) and by exporting energy 
to China via pipelines that skirt Russia. 
This has made Moscow all the more determined to render Nabucco 
economically nonviable. Its chosen instrument toward this end is the 
$45 billion South Stream project, which would deliver gas to southern 
Europe through a pipeline crossing the Black Sea from Russia.19 While 
Russia’s natural gas production is declining and even its long-term pur-
chase agreements with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan are 
likely to leave the project short of the volume it needs to be commer-
cially viable, Moscow appears no less determined to pursue it. Gaz-
prom’s monopolistic stance on South Stream clashes with provisions of 
the EU’s Third Energy Package, which mandates unbundling energy 
transportation from production and sales. Russia’s neomercantilist ap-
proach to energy relations with Europe has fueled mistrust among many 
EU states, especially the newer East European members.20
Like the Nordstream pipeline project, which will carry Russian gas to 
Europe via the Baltic Sea, South Stream attests to the Kremlin’s realiza-
tion that the question of who supplies gas to whom and through which 
pipelines is much more than simply a matter of economics. Important 
strategic considerations are involved, of which three are particularly im-
portant.21 One is enhancing Russia’s leverage over Europe, which will 
increase should Europe’s energy supply diversification strategy fail. A 
second is greater Russian influence over Central Asia, where China is 
making inroads and could eventually displace Russia as the dominant 
power in the region. Central Asia’s dependence on Russia is bound to in-
crease if the volume of its gas exports flowing through Russian pipelines 
increases; conversely, its autonomy will be enhanced as new pipelines 
bypassing Russia go online. Moscow recognizes this possibility and is 
energetically seeking to retain and expand its influence through the Cus-
toms Union. A third goal is reducing Russia’s dependence on Ukraine, 
which now serves as a key conduit for its gas exports to Europe. The 
Ukrainian transit issue is critical to Moscow with Victor Yanukovych’s 
government ousted and the country’s future orientation uncertain.
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Neomercantilism also shapes Russia’s policies toward foreign invest-
ment in its energy sector. The need to secure capital and state-of-the-art 
technology should push Russia to open its hydrocarbon sector to West-
ern and other international oil firms, not least because domestic oil and 
gas production have been stagnant for lack of investment and because 
existing oil sources (“old oil”) are being depleted. However, the trend 
has been in the opposite direction, as oil prices spiked in the 2000s and 
the Kremlin decided to establish domestic control of oil and gas through 
state-controlled “national champions.” Using the threat of massive 
penalties for environmental violations, it forced Shell and its Japanese 
partners in the Sakhalin II venture to transfer controlling ownership to 
Gazprom in late 2006. Transneft acquired ownership of the CPC pipe-
line in 2007, cementing its virtual monopoly of Russian oil pipelines, 
while state-owned Rosneft acquired BP’s interest in TNK-BP in 2013 
after years of official harassment over supposed environmental and 
tax issues.22
The same pattern is apparent in the natural gas sector. State-owned 
Gazprom, for example, did not have the technology or the capital to 
develop the giant Shtokman natural gas field in the forbidding Barents 
Sea, so it contracted with Norway’s Statoil and France’s Total to join it as 
minority partners. Gazprom holds a 51 percent share in the project and 
is sole owner of the production license and the reserves. The plan was that 
after phase one was completed, Statoil and Total would be obligated to 
transfer their company shares to Gazprom.23 The US and Canadian shale 
gas breakthroughs, however, called into question this expensive and com-
plicated project, negating a key element of Moscow’s energy strategy.24
What counts in the new Russian order is power maximization by the 
state, and ensuring national control of energy and other natural resources 
is seen as an essential means to that end. Putin’s overriding objectives 
include rebuilding a strong centralized state, ensuring and increasing 
Russia’s status as a great power, developing a robust Russian nationalism 
capable of unifying the country, maintaining a sphere of influence in as 
many of the post-Soviet states as possible, and establishing state control 
over important branches of the economy. Those sectors of the economy 
related to energy and raw materials are vital to this project, so control-
ling them through direct ownership or regulatory authority, or more 
informal mechanisms, is a Kremlin priority. Energy is the regime’s most 
valuable instrument to realize Russia’s foreign policy and national security 
Neomercantilism and Great-Power Energy Competition in Central Asia and the Caspian
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2014 [ 27 ]
goals. The program for establishing state control over national energy 
resources and infrastructure has proved popular. A Levada Center poll 
conducted in June 2006 found that fully 85 percent of respondents 
favored the renationalization of Russia’s oil and gas industries, with only 
7 percent opposed.25 As nationalism surged and advocates of restoring 
Russia’s great-power status gained in popularity, the notion of an 
economy free from state intervention lost adherents.
China’s Neomercantilist Strategies
The crucial role of oil in enabling China to maintain its breakneck 
pace of economic growth and its increasing reliance on foreign sources 
have made obtaining oil and gas from Central Asia a major element in 
Beijing’s energy strategy. Middle Eastern and African oil are more im-
portant than Central Asian in China’s calculus (about 50 percent of its 
petroleum imports come from the Middle East and 30 percent from 
Africa), but the bulk of this oil transits vulnerable sea routes, so alter-
natives that can be supplied by pipeline confer greater security. Kazakh, 
Turkmen, and Russian energy transported by pipeline bypasses the Strait 
of Malacca choke point, making them especially attractive suppliers in 
Beijing’s eyes.
Although China has embraced market mechanisms for much of its 
economy and has joined liberal trading regimes such as the WTO, it con-
tinues to pursue a form of neomercantilist energy policy.26 Three state-
owned companies—China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), 
the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)—dominate China’s energy 
sector. These national oil companies (NOC) as national champions were 
tasked with the political goal of strengthening China’s economic security 
by securing upstream assets and diversifying supplies.  Since the legisla-
tion governing China’s energy sector changed in the early 1990s, the 
NOCs have been encouraged to acquire energy assets abroad and to 
form partnerships with non-Chinese firms. Their ability to draw oil and 
gas to China has been strengthened by the reform of domestic energy prices 
and permission to list subsidiaries on foreign exchanges, both steps in-
tended to provide the funds needed to fulfill their mandate.27 
As part of the mandate, starting in 1997 the three big Chinese state 
oil companies (later joined by smaller firms) moved in force into Central 
Asia, buying stakes in major oil fields and state-owned oil companies 
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in Kazakhstan and completing construction of the 1,348-mile Aktyubinsk-
Alashankou oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China in 2008 and the 
1,240-mile gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan in 2009. These state-backed moves have pitted China not 
only against Western firms, but also against those from Russia, not-
withstanding the Russia-China “strategic partnership” and its Central 
Asia embodiment, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.28 For both 
countries, but especially Turkmenistan whose gas exports were domi-
nated by Gazprom, the China connection has reduced their dependence 
on Russia.
China’s energy policy is crafted, monitored, and supported through 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which 
is overseen by the State Council. The National Energy Administration 
(together with the NDRC) sets domestic wholesale prices, approves new 
energy projects, and implements the government’s energy policies. The 
Chinese government provides diplomatic support and financial assis-
tance to its oil companies and expects their investments and operations 
to support the state goal of energy security. However, bureaucratic fragmen-
tation in the energy sector weakens the state’s ability to direct Chinese 
NOCs toward supporting central political goals and contributes to 
greater competition between NOCs operating overseas.29
Although state involvement in China’s oil sector more closely resembles a 
neomercantilist than a purely liberal approach, the extent of state domi-
nance should not be overstated and is markedly less pronounced than 
in Russia. This is especially so in the case of foreign investment in the 
domestic energy sector: although Beijing sets guidelines, which among 
other things ensure that foreign firms form partnerships with state-
owned companies, it has enacted reforms that have made for a notably 
more predictable and hospitable environment for international energy 
companies than obtainable in Russia. As a result, Chinese oil firms have 
in recent years become key advocates of overseas investment, acquir-
ing equity stakes throughout Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America.30 
Moreover, China’s NOCs have developed strong corporate interests—
maximizing profits, satisfying shareholders, enlarging market share—
that frequently set them at odds with their fellow NOCs and, some-
times, with the priorities of the central government in Beijing. China’s 
leaders, in contrast to their Russian counterparts, appear cognizant of 
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the limitations of neomercantilism and have gradually moderated state 
control of NOCs.
China’s reform process has been more gradual than Russia’s and 
evolved from an initial policy of a strong role for the state toward greater 
autonomy for state-owned firms. China has assiduously sought to avoid 
Russian-style political fragmentation while proceeding with liberal eco-
nomic reforms. In both domestic and international contexts, Beijing’s 
leaders use the power of market forces while seeking to preserve central-
ized state control, particularly over strategic commodities like oil and 
gas. Specifically, one component of China’s “going out” strategy in-
volved state encouragement and assistance to national oil companies in 
acquiring upstream energy assets (often above market prices), with the 
expectation of improved long-term security from directly controlling 
oil and gas properties. This policy is most notable in Kazakhstan, where 
Chinese firms (CNPC and Sinopec) have acquired—either outright or 
in the form of substantial shares—energy assets in the Kashagan, North 
Buzachi, and Aktobe fields, competing aggressively and with state guid-
ance against foreign firms.31
Such neomercantilist policies are designed to ensure an uninterrupted 
flow of hydrocarbons, with the added advantage of having a source of 
supply that runs overland and is thus less susceptible to disruption than 
China’s other energy imports that move through long sea lanes from 
Africa and the Middle East. Oil and gas piped directly from Central 
Asia are key components of China’s efforts to maintain high growth rates 
and preserve social stability—without relying solely on laissez-faire market 
forces to supply energy needs. By contrast, most overseas Chinese equity 
oil projects—in Africa, for example—produce oil that is sold on the 
global market rather than shipped to Chinese ports.
National energy companies such as Gazprom, Rosneft, Transneft, 
CNPC, CNOOC, and Sinopec are powerful economic entities but also 
serve as foreign policy instruments of their respective states, precisely 
because they are not fully private actors. While NOCs vary considerably 
in their autonomy, they all need to balance the economic demands of 
the international market with the political needs of their governments. 
For Russia, its hydrocarbon exports, the size and reach of its energy 
firms, and its control of key pipelines serve as major sources of national 
power, substituting in part for the international influence Moscow lost 
when the Soviet Union disintegrated. For China, government-corporate 
 Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2014
Charles E. Ziegler and Rajan Menon
[ 30 ]
partnerships help secure energy supplies, which, in turn, are crucial for 
maintaining the country’s breakneck pace of economic growth, enabling 
the Communist Party to present itself to Chinese citizens as a competent 
custodian and continuing China’s ascent as a front-rank global power. 
Chinese officials have been explicit about the link between energy 
and security. For example, when the 960-kilometer pipeline connecting 
Atasu in Kazakhstan to the Alatau Pass in Xinjiang was opened in May 
2006, the deputy general manager of the China Petroleum Exploration 
and Development Company observed that the new line would reduce 
China’s dependence on the Strait of Malacca, through which 80 percent 
of China’s oil imports had been flowing.32 This degree of dependence 
on seaborne energy constitutes a major liability on the security front 
because it enables the US Navy, which is far superior to its Chinese 
counterpart, to disrupt the lifeblood of China’s economy. This explains 
Beijing’s efforts to cultivate Russia as another major overland energy 
supplier as well as its increasing determination to improve its naval 
capabilities.33 With completion of phase one of the East Siberian Pacific 
Ocean (ESPO) pipeline, Russia was exporting 300,000 bpd of crude to 
China by late 2013, and plans call for doubling this amount by 2015.34 
Beijing will likely increase efforts to secure reliable, long-term sources 
for oil, to diversify the sources of supply, and to prevent adversaries from 
disrupting supplies. China’s rapid economic growth and increasing af-
fluence will surely deepen its reliance on imported oil, which is expected 
to increase from 50 percent of total consumption in 2008 to 79 percent 
by 2030.35
Neomercantilism in Russia and China is part of an overall determi-
nation to counter US hegemony which is linked to an ideology advo-
cating unfettered markets for privately owned international oil com-
panies. National oil companies are generally larger and more powerful 
than international oil majors, and NOCs confer on the state significant 
international influence. However, Chinese and Russian oil companies 
are relatively late to the game, and many of the most lucrative proper-
ties are already controlled by national oil companies in oil producing 
states or by the oil majors. To be effective as state-supported actors in 
the global economy, NOCs must be modern, efficient, and competitive 
with other national and international energy firms. Chinese officials re-
alize this and have allowed their NOCs greater independence in raising 
capital and pursuing overseas acquisitions. But with greater autonomy, 
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the NOCs’ interests—particularly their pursuit of profitability—have 
often diverged from state goals. Efforts to exert greater state control over 
oil and gas firms, as with Gazprom, may harmonize state-NOC interests 
to some degree, but with clear tradeoffs in terms of declining competi-
tiveness and profitability. Thus neomercantilist strategies embody con-
tradictory impulses that may not be reconcilable.
Russian and Chinese neomercantilist strategies to penetrate and con-
trol the Central Asian energy market have cast this great-power energy 
relationship in basically competitive, zero-sum terms, despite assertions 
of a “strategic partnership” from both Moscow and Beijing. This energy 
competition has impacted security cooperation and multilateral institu-
tion building in the Central Asian region.
Energy Security and Great-Power 
Competition in Central Asia
Russian and Chinese approaches to Central Asia and to the world 
more broadly incorporate contradictory elements. On the one hand, 
both countries suspect the US-dominated liberal economic order places 
them at a disadvantage and exposes them to social and economic in-
stabilities. Indeed, they frequently point out that the United States itself 
violates its professed principles of free trade and open markets when the 
system works against US national interests. On the other hand, Russia 
and China view international trade and security regimes as having some 
utility, even if they are (as in the case of the World Trade Organiza-
tion) dominated by the US hegemon. However, regional organizations 
like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Central Asian 
Regional Economic Cooperation program (CEREC), and the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEc) seem to be preferred by Beijing and 
Moscow, since they are relatively weak and do not preclude bilateral 
security or trading arrangements.
While regional organizations have become more prominent, there is 
still no viable trading regime in Central Asia. International coopera-
tion is difficult to achieve in the absence of a hegemon committed to 
establishing a stable order. But the question for Beijing and Moscow is 
who the hegemon will be; neither China nor Russia is content to have 
the United States set and police the rules of the game because, in classic 
neomercantilist spirit, they are convinced Washington will play this role 
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to advance its relative standing and not act in the interest of all. Russian 
and Chinese neomercantilist strategies, in effect, promote a regionalism 
that enables them to resolve conflicts and promote stability while resist-
ing the presence of the global hegemon.36
Although Russia provides one-quarter to one-third of Central Asia’s 
imports and absorbs 10–20 percent of the region’s exports, its privileged 
position in the region is in danger of being eroded. China’s economic 
presence is increasing rapidly; more importantly, the China-Russia eco-
nomic relationship in Central Asia is basically competitive and will be-
come more so. This competition is already evident as Moscow promotes 
its Customs Union as a trading bloc, while China maneuvers to position 
the SCO as its preferred economic regime. In this environment, power-
ful state-controlled energy firms (and indeed non-energy state-owned 
companies) seek relative gains for their patron states, with the state exer-
cising its power to advance firms’ interests. While the rivalry between 
the Russia-China partnership and the West gets the most attention these 
days, in the long run the competition in Central Asia will pit Beijing 
against Moscow, with both seeking to dominate the sources and trans-
portation networks for Central Asia’s energy.
This is not to suggest an imminent military conflict between Russia and 
China in Central Asia. But President Putin’s drive to expand the Cus-
toms Union into a broader Eurasian Union comprised of both Central 
Asian and European former Soviet republics provides regional elites with 
a guarantee against encroachment from powerful neighbors, whether 
from the East (China) or West (the EU and NATO).37 Membership in the 
Customs Union appeals to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus 
not because it will generate substantial economic benefits, but more so 
because of the political protection it will afford. In Ukraine’s case, con-
flicting pressures have splintered the country between those who prefer 
Moscow’s design and those who favor a European path. Unease over 
China’s growing presence in Central Asia and the absence of such clear 
lines of demarcation within these countries suggests that instability there 
will likely derive from state weakness and problems of succession rather 
than great-power competition.
Neomercantilist energy policies in Central Asia reflect a zero-sum 
mentality. Each state seeks to maximize its power and influence unilat-
erally and through different multilateral organizations—Russia through 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Customs Union, and bilateral 
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security treaties with Central Asian states, and China through the Shang-
hai Treaty Organization and bilateral trade and energy deals. In the 
absence of an effective international energy regime for Central Asia, the 
major powers jockey for advantage while the smaller energy-rich states 
seek to play the giants against each other.
There is considerable congruence among the political and security 
goals of Russia and China and those of the regional states in Central 
Asia. Russia and China cooperate on security; both seek to limit US 
and NATO influence in Central Asia and to constrain US unilateralism 
globally. This balancing behavior does not extend to energy resources, 
where each competes with the other for access. Russia and China use 
their national oil and gas companies to enhance their political influence 
in Central Asia and to gain an edge over the other. For example, after 
the Russian government’s takeover of Yukos, the proposed oil pipeline 
to China was sidelined in favor of a route to the Pacific advocated by 
the Japanese. This decision infuriated the Chinese, who were only partly 
mollified when Russian officials promised to construct a spur to Daqing. In 
response, China redoubled its efforts to conclude energy deals in Central 
Asia. The Chinese government has consistently supported its national 
oil companies through a broader policy of engagement, including trade 
and high-level diplomacy, and by providing assistance for infrastructure 
development.
China’s foreign policy, like Russia’s, asserts near-absolute, nineteenth-
century-style sovereignty to shield the country from pernicious foreign 
influences.38 China’s “new security concept” posits a foundational role 
for Mao’s five principles of peaceful coexistence: mutual respect for 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in 
the internal affairs of other countries, equality and mutual benefit, and 
peaceful coexistence. The workings of the SCO and the ASEAN Regional 
Forum are held up as examples of the successful implementation of 
China’s security concept.39 As in Russia, the Chinese government fears 
populism and pluralism, where student, peasant, and religious move-
ments are perceived as undermining the Communist Party’s political 
monopoly and jeopardizing domestic stability.
Securing reliable oil and gas supplies is vital to the government’s chief 
goal of preserving domestic stability by maintaining high economic 
growth rates. The PRC has significant crude oil—about 20.4 billion 
barrels proven reserves in 2013—but consumption continues to grow 
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rapidly, even in the midst of record prices, and imports constitute an 
ever-larger share of China’s needs. While domestic production supplied 
55 percent of China’s needs in 2006, this had dropped to 42 percent 
by 2013. China’s energy policy calls for maximizing domestic produc-
tion and developing alternative energy sources, but assuming that 
China’s record growth does not slow dramatically, there is no chance 
of the country becoming energy self-sufficient. According to the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA), China is poised to surpass 
the United States as the world’s largest energy importer in 2014, and 
the EIA projects that China will import 72 percent of its oil in 2040.40
Neomercantilism makes a distinctive contribution to our understand-
ing of how the major powers interact in Central Asia. While there is a 
good deal of talk about the need to cooperate on energy exploration and 
development in Central Asia and the absolute gains to be realized from 
diversifying world supplies, Russia and China each seem to be seeking 
unilateral advantage in the region. The Central Asian states themselves, 
and the secondary powers with interests in the region (Iran, Japan, Korea, 
and India), also compete for advantage by using state-owned or state-
influenced energy companies.
However, neomercantilism cannot provide completely satisfactory 
explanations for the dynamics and complexities of Central Asian energy 
politics. For example, the technological and financial demands of ex-
ploring and developing hydrocarbon reserves in this remote region have 
led to unlikely forms of cooperation that would not be predicted by neo-
mercantilism. Examples of international cooperation in the region in-
clude the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, efforts to develop Kazakhstan’s 
Kashagan field in the North Caspian, and even the Kazakhstan-China 
oil pipeline, which regularly transports Russian oil to China. Here, the 
national interests of states cannot substitute for the modern technologi-
cal and infrastructural needs of oil and gas production. Countries that 
venture too far down the path of state control risk falling behind.
As the rivalry among states in Central Asia demonstrates, neomer-
cantilism is the dominant mode of competition, and in the wake of the 
Great Recession its appeal may be waxing rather than waning. Zero-sum 
conceptions are difficult to avoid, and the pressures for state involve-
ment in economies are growing. The appeal of nationalism, including 
economic and resource nationalism, has not diminished—if anything, 
the commitment to strengthening state sovereignty by seeking privileged 
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access to markets and resources and by actively supporting national 
firms is gaining strength. This trend is likely to increase as the vulner-
abilities that citizens and states face in a world of untrammeled markets 
are becoming more evident. The failure of neoliberal economics to bring 
prosperity to many parts of the former Soviet Union, the bitter reaction 
against inequalities produced by neoliberal policies, and the success of 
state-guided economic development in China have drawn policymakers 
in these countries toward economic nationalist strategies.
Russian-Chinese energy competition in Central Asia does not preclude 
bilateral cooperation. In 2013 the two sides signed an $85 billion deal 
for Rosneft to deliver some 100 million tons of oil per year to Sinopec 
through the expanded ESPO, while preliminary agreements on LNG 
were reached between Yamal LNG and PetroChina International.41 But 
in Central Asia the relationship is essentially zero-sum, with China real-
izing gains at Russia’s expense. For example, Central Asian gas exports 
to Russia have allowed Gazprom to cover the domestic Russian market, 
leaving sufficient quantities for export to Europe and guaranteeing the 
bulk of the company’s revenues. Thus, substantial Chinese imports of 
Turkmen natural gas constitute a net loss for Russia’s premier national 
champion, Gazprom. Similarly, the 10 million tons per year of Kazakh 
oil piped directly to China constitutes a net loss of lucrative transit fees 
for state-owned Transneft.
Competition between Russia and China may intensify as Beijing’s 
presence in Central Asia grows. On a 2013 trip through Central Asia, 
Chinese president Xi Jinping proposed that his country and Central 
Asia cooperate to build a “new Silk Road” from the Pacific to the Baltic, 
noting the 100-fold increase in trade over the past two decades. Xi also 
announced Beijing’s intention to provide funds for 30,000 scholarships 
to SCO members and praised the development of political and cul-
tural ties between Central Asia and China.42  The regional geopolitical 
balance will continue to shift in China’s favor if Moscow cannot move 
beyond rhetoric and heavy-handed pressure to match China’s economic 
and demographic power.43
Oil and gas are unique commodities: not only are they critical to 
modern economies, their supply—unlike that of many other tradable 
items, such as clothes, electronics, or furniture—is exhaustible. Further-
more, increased consumption of oil and gas does not make everyone better 
off, as conventional economic theory assumes. If China consumes more 
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oil, there is less available for motorists elsewhere, at least at affordable 
prices. Consuming more oil and gas may raise individual living stan-
dards, but it also generates more pollution and accelerates global warm-
ing. The collective action problem of the production and consumption 
of hydrocarbons casts the issue in zero-sum terms, which helps explain 
the neomercantilist mind-set on energy. By highlighting the problems 
of collective action, neomercantilism holds out little hope that inter- 
national or even regional regimes intended to smooth the edges of resource 
competition will succeed, particularly in a world where new centers of 
economic power will increase the demand for critical commodities.
Conclusion
The preceding analysis suggests several policy-relevant conclusions. 
First, the historic north-south axis that originated in the nineteenth-
century expansion southward of Tsarist Russia and tied Central Asia and 
the Caspian states to Russia for some 150 years is being undermined by 
competition Moscow faces from Europe, the United States, and China. 
Russia will continue to resist this process, as evident from its energy 
strategy in these two regions. Great-power cooperation in Central Asia 
and the Caspian could mitigate common problems ranging from envi-
ronmental degradation to curbing extremist and terrorist movements. 
Competition over energy will negate much of the incentive for collective 
action because energy has a unique strategic dimension, more so because 
of the neomercantilist outlook of Moscow and Beijing. 
Second, whatever the United States and Europe may profess, Russia 
and China do not accept their self-proclaimed fealty to liberal principles. 
Both Moscow and Beijing believe US and European energy policies are 
in fact designed to undercut Chinese and Russian positions in Central 
Asia and the Caspian; this is particularly true of Russia. Thus govern-
mental cooperation on energy security is unlikely, even when opportu-
nities arise. 
Third, despite the “strategic partnership” claimed by China and Russia, 
it is China, more than the West, that poses the greatest challenge to 
Russia’s long-established economic position in Central Asia. And given 
Russia’s neomercantilist outlook, it sees the loss of economic influence as 
no different from the loss of political influence—indeed the two are now 
equated in Kremlin policy. This raises the question: despite the rocky 
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state of the US-Russian relationship, will Moscow eventually hedge its 
bets and seek a rapprochement with the United States to balance a rising 
China which is now challenging its standing in its southern perimeter? 
Finally, with the advent of a post-US Afghanistan, the prospect of in-
stability spilling over into Central Asia is no longer a problem primarily 
for Russia, the historic hegemon, but for the United States and China 
as well, because both are now deeply implicated in the region, in part 
because of their quest for energy. The problem is that if the pattern of 
great-power interaction revealed by our analysis persists—and there are 
sound reasons to conclude it will—the prospects for collective action are 
not promising. 
The neomercantilist perspective provides significant insights into the 
sources of, and strategies used in, major power competition in Central 
Asia. Neomercantilism has the advantage of incorporating the economic 
facets of great-power competition in a specific and substantial way. Our 
analysis has found considerable support for the first hypothesis—that 
national interests of statist powers lead them to employ neomercantilist 
strategies in the energy sphere. There is also persuasive evidence to sup-
port the second and third hypotheses—that security concerns will lead 
states to seek control over energy supplies and transit routes, and that 
states will tend to behave according to a zero-sum, competitive logic 
when it comes to hydrocarbons. However, there are significant differ-
ences between the two states. China has in recent years followed a more 
flexible neomercantilist policy of granting NOCs greater autonomy, 
while Russia has consolidated and extended state control over its larger 
energy firms.
Energy competition has had a major impact in shaping great-power 
relations in Central Asia. There has indeed been a contest among the 
major powers in Central Asia—a new frontier of the post–Cold War 
world—and much of the contest has centered on gaining access to the 
region’s oil and gas resources. Rather than trust the market, Russia and 
China have utilized neomercantilist strategies to achieve their energy 
goals in the region. Moscow’s priorities are to maximize access to Central 
Asia’s hydrocarbons through its national oil and gas companies, to 
monopolize the transit routes for energy, and to maximize government 
revenue. Politically, Russia seeks to restore influence lost during the chaotic 
1990s, viewing Central Asia as a sphere of privileged interest where it 
has the right to limit the presence of competing powers. Moscow is 
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willing to cooperate with the other great powers to contain terror-
ism and instability in Central Asia, but the long-term presence of US 
troops in the region and China’s emergence as a great power present 
distinct challenges.
China’s energy goals in Central Asia include seeking upstream assets 
for its national oil companies and promoting direct supply routes for 
oil and gas from the region. Chinese energy investments are part of a 
broader process of economic infiltration of the Central Asian economies, 
as Chinese consumer goods gradually displace those from Russia. 
Beijing’s political and security goals are focused on containing the “three 
evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism; preserving regional 
stability; and patiently expanding its influence through trade and other 
mechanisms of soft power. As a result of its more flexible neomercantilist 
policies, China’s influence in Central Asia may be expected to increase 
over the long term. 
Notes
1. We define Central Asia as the five former Soviet republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbeki-
stan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. The “Great Game,” of course, refers to the nineteenth-century 
struggle for influence between Britain and Russia.
2. Both French and Japanese responses to the 1970s oil price shocks have been described 
as neomercantilist, and the US response to China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s 
(CNOOC) attempted takeover of Unocal was essentially neomercantilist.
3. Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
4. See Trevor Houser, “The Roots of Chinese Oil Investment Abroad,” Asia Policy 5 
(2008): 141–66.
5. For works influenced by the neomercantilist framework, see Leah Haus, “The East Euro-
pean Countries and GATT: The Role of Realism, Mercantilism, and Regime Theory in 
Explaining East-West Trade Negotiations,” International Organization 45, no. 2 (1999): 163–
66; Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Direct 
Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International 
Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: 
Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); and 
Paolo Gerrier and Pier Carlo Padoan, “Neomercantilism and International Economic Stability,” 
International Organization 40, no. 1 (Winter 1986): 29–42. For a pithy statement of the paradigm, 
see Dani Rodrik, “Mercantilism Reconsidered,” Project Syndicate, 10 July 2010, http://www 
.project-syndicate.org/commentary/mercantilism-reconsidered. Our interpretation aligns with 
the broad variant described by Rodrik and is not limited to state-supported efforts to achieve 
trade surpluses, which is the one favored by Gerrier and Padoan.
Neomercantilism and Great-Power Energy Competition in Central Asia and the Caspian
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2014 [ 39 ]
6. Hans Morgenthau pointed out years ago that resource dependency forces states to rely 
on the goodwill or power of other states. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 5th ed. (New 
York: Knopf, 1978).
7. Jakub J. Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 2006).
8. See Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994).
9. Saudi Arabia was in first place with 11.7 million bpd, while the United States was a close 
second at 11.1 million bpd thanks to new fracking technologies. “Top World Oil Producers, 
2012,” Energy Information Administration (EIA), http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm.
10. “Overview of Oil and Natural Gas in the Caspian Sea Region,” EIA, http://www.eia 
.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=CSR&src.
11. “Remarks by Under Secretary of State William J. Burns at the Conference on ‘Silk Road 
Trade and Investment: New Pathways for U.S.-Central Asian Economic Ties,’ ” US Chamber of 
Commerce, 7 October 2009, http://kazakhstan.usembassy.gov/st-10-07-09.html.
12. Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, “Introduction: Energy, Conflict, and Development 
in the Caspian Sea Region,” in Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Ebel 
and Menon, eds. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); Agata Loskot-Strachota 
and Janek Lasocki, “End of Nabucco—End of Southern Gas Corridor?” Energy Post, 27 June 
2013, http://www.energypost.eu/end-of-nabucco-end-of-southern-gas-corridor/; and “Shah 
Deniz Project Selects TAP as European Gas Pipeline,” Wall Street Journal, 28 June 2013.
13. According to Sergei Nikolaev, deputy director of the Third CIS Department in the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Central Asia has a “special importance” for Russian 
national security, and energy is an “engine” of cooperation. “Russia-Central Asia: Toward 
Prosperity and Security,” International Affairs (Moscow) no. 4 (2009): 26–34.
14. Harley Balzer, “The Putin Thesis and Russian Energy Policy,” Post-Soviet Affairs 21, 
no. 3 (2005): 210–25.
15. The close symbiosis of Russian energy companies and the state is detailed in Marshall I. 
Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
16. Adrian Dellecker, Caspian Pipeline Consortium: Bellwether of Russia’s Investment Climate? 
(Paris: Russia/NIS Center, 2008), http://www.ifri.org/files/Russie/ifri_RNV_Dellecker_CPC 
_ENG_juin2008.pdf.
17. In late 2013, Transneft announced that the expansion, which would more than double 
capacity to about 1.5 million bpd, was behind schedule and would not be completed before 
2015. Elizabeth Corner, ed., “Russia’s Transneft Says Caspian Pipeline Expansion is Running 
Late,” Energy Global, 9 November 2013, http://www.energyglobal.com/news/exploration 
/articles/Russias_Transneft_says_Caspian_pipeline_expansion_is_running_late_459.aspx# 
.Uwt6MuBYwRk. On Kashagan’s potential and problems, see “Kazakh President Sees ‘Serious’ 
Oil at Blighted Kashagan in 2014,” Bloomberg.com, 11 February 2014, http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/2014-02-11/kazakh-president-sees-serious-oil-at-blighted-kashagan-in-2014.html.
18. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, “Is the Trans Caspian Pipeline Back? Russia Thinks So, and 
Maybe Turkmenistan Does, Too,” Natural Gas Europe, 7 November 2013, http://www.natural 
gaseurope.com/trans-caspian-pipeline-russia-turkmenistan-sergei-lavrov.
19. Annexing the Crimean Peninsula could reduce the undersea portion of said pipeline 
by approximately 200 miles. See Atlas of the World (Washington: National Geographic Society, 
2005), plate 68.
20. See Charles E. Ziegler, “Energy Pipeline Networks and Trust: The European Union 
and Russia in Comparative Perspective,” International Relations 27, no. 1 (March 2013): 3–29.
 Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2014
Charles E. Ziegler and Rajan Menon
[ 40 ]
21. On the Nordstream and South Stream projects’ strategic significance for Russia, see 
Janusz Bugajski, Dismantling the West: Russia’s Atlantic Agenda (Washington: Potomac Books, 
2009), 131–45.
22. Thane Gustafson, Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2012), 422–38.
23. Eini Laaksonen, “Political Risks of Foreign Direct Investment in the Russian Gas 
Industry—The Shtokman Gas Field Project in the Arctic Ocean,” Electronic Publications of 
Pan-European Institute 14/2010, Turku School of Economics, Turku, Finland, http://www 
.tse.fi/FI/yksikot/erillislaitokset/pei/Documents/Julkaisut/BRE%20Expert%20Articles%20
2010%20netti.pdf#page=171.
24. “Gazprom May Shelve Shtokman Project as US Shale Revolution Bites,” RT.com, 3 
June 2013.
25. Moreover, 44 percent of those polled thought a more centralized government on the 
Chinese model was better suited to Russia, while 30 percent thought a US-style liberal democratic 
form of government more appropriate. See “Russians Support Putin’s Re-Nationalization of Oil, 
Control of Media, but See Democratic Future,” WorldPublicOpinion.org, 10 July 2006, http://
worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/breuropera/224.php?lb=breu&pnt=224&nid=&id=.
26. This is not to suggest that the interests of Chinese NOCs and the state always coin-
cide. Rather, China’s NOCs pursue profits and market position while trying (with varying suc-
cess) to promote Beijing’s foreign policy goals. For studies that have examined whether China 
is pursuing a neomercantilist energy policy, see Joseph McCarthy, “Crude ‘Oil Mercantil-
ism’? Chinese Oil Engagement in Kazakhstan,” Pacific Affairs 86, no. 2 (June 2013): 257–80; 
Roland Dannreuther, “China and Global Oil: Vulnerability and Opportunity,” International 
Affairs 87, no. 6 (November 2011): 1345–64; and Chen Shaofeng, “Has China’s Foreign Energy 
Quest Enhanced Its Energy Security?” China Quarterly 207 (September 2011): 600–25.
27. See Philip Andrews-Speed and Roland Dannreuther, China, Oil and Global Politics 
(New York: Routledge, 2011); and Carrie Liu Currier and Manochehr Dorraj, eds., China’s 
Energy Relations with the Developing World (New York: Continuum, 2011).
28. Rajan Menon, “The Limits of Chinese-Russian Partnership,” Survival 51, no. 3 
(2009): 99–130.
29. Chih-Shian Liou, “Bureaucratic Politics and Overseas Investment by Chinese State-
owned Oil Companies,” Asian Survey 29, no. 4 (2009): 670–90.
30. Charles E. Ziegler, “Competing for Markets and Influence: Asian National Oil Com-
panies in Eurasia,” Asian Perspective 32, no. 1 (2008): 129–63; and Erica Downs, “The Chinese 
Energy Security Debate,” China Quarterly 177 (2004): 21–41.
31. David L. O. Hayward, “China’s Oil Supply Dependence,” Alexander’s Oil and Gas 
Connections, 19 June 2009, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/cns93332.htm.
32. Charles E. Ziegler, “The Energy Factor in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Journal of Chinese 
Political Science 11, no. 1 (2006): 1–23.
33. On the Chinese navy and energy, see Gabriel B. Collins et al., eds., China’s Energy 
Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008).
34. Jake Rudnitsky, “Putin’s Pipeline to send 25% of Russia’s Oil Exports East,” Bloomberg 
.com, 7 March, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-07/putin-pipeline-to-send 
-25-of-russia-s-oil-exports-east.html.
35. Julie Jiang and Jonathan Sinton, “Overseas Investments by Chinese National Oil Com-
panies: Assessing the Drivers and Impacts,” IEA, February 2011, http://www.iea.org/papers/2011 
/overseas_china.pdf.
Neomercantilism and Great-Power Energy Competition in Central Asia and the Caspian
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2014 [ 41 ]
36. Bjorn Hettne develops the idea of neomercantilism as regionalism in “Neo-Mercantilism: 
The Pursuit of Regionness,” Cooperation and Conflict 28, no. 3 (1993): 211–32.
37. Pavel Salin, “Spiritual Values to Cement the Eurasian Union,” Russia in Global Af-
fairs, 26 October 2013, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Spiritual-Values-to-Cement-the 
-Eurasian-Union-16163.
38. For an excellent overview of China’s foreign policy, see David Shambaugh, China Goes 
Global: The Partial Power (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013).
39. Derek Mitchell and Carola McGiffert, “Expanding the ‘Strategic Periphery’: A History 
of China’s Interaction with the Developing World,” in China and the Developing World: Beijing’s 
Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, Joshua Eisenman and Eric Heginbotham, eds. (Armonk, 
NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2007).
40. Energy Information Administration, “China,” updated 4 February 2014, http://www.eia 
.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH.
41. “Russia and China Strengthen Trade Ties with $85 billion Oil Deal,” RT, 23 October 
2013, http://rt.com/business/rosneft-china-sinopec-oil-537/.
42. Wu Jiao and Zhang Yunbi, “Xi Proposes a ‘New Silk Road’ with Central Asia,” China Daily 
USA, 8 September 2013, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-09/08/content_16952304.htm. 
43. Aleksei Vlasov, director of the Center for the Study of Post-Soviet Space at Moscow 
State University, argues that China’s position in Central Asia is now commensurate with Russia’s, 
and that within five years China will be the key external power for the Central Asian states. 
Ivan Antonov and Vasilii Voropaev, “Chto ishchet i nakhodit Kitai v Srednei Azii,” Izvestia.ru, 
26 March 2010, http://www.izvestia.ru/world/article3142281/.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed or implied in SSQ are those of the authors and 
are not officially sanctioned by any agency or department of the US government. 
We encourage you to send comments to: strategicstudiesquarterly@us.af.mil.
